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I. INTRODUCTION
The actions of administrative agencies encompass life's adventure for
all persons who reside in the nation, independent of their state, county, or
municipality. We educate, sanitize, police, and regulate occupations, pro-
fessions, business, and industry through such agencies. Furthermore, the
functioning of the agency is not necessarily an institutional expression, but
often is exercised by individuals within and without the parameters of
agency authority. Because of this pervasiveness and lack of common direc-
tion it is necessary to rely on judicial review as an available means for
modifying or terminating an administrative agency action.
The torts actions form a time-honored substantive system designed to
protect individuals, as well as collectives and organizations, from civil
wrongdoing. It is therefore appropriate that, apart from the judicial review
for administrative agency civil wrongdoing that has been established by
statutes and jurisdictional privileges, a remedy should exist in tort for agen-
cy wrongdoing. Presently the torts remedies contemplate a group termed
"unintentional" (i.e., negligence actions), and another group termed the
"intentional" torts, both a part of our common law heritage., This latter
group includes assault, battery, illegal seizure, detention or imprisonment
of individuals, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, the defamatory
torts, fraud, and certain torts of more modem application, such as the il-
legal deprivation of civil rights, wrongful invasion of privacy, and trespass
to contractual expectations or the right to publicity. The judicial review
available for allegedly wrongful governmental agency actions encompasses
* Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law. A.B., 1938, Brooklyn
College; J.D., 1957, Brooklyn College of Law.
1. See generally PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971).
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the' full spectrum of redress afforded by these varied hinintentionaland
intentional torts causes of action.2
In seeking judicial review of what a regulatee believes to be unjust,
irregular, excessive, or unfair action taken by an administrative agency, the
regulatee looks first to the underlying statute of the agency, and second, if
the agency is a federal one, to the Administrative Procedure Act.3 The
latter statute reads in pertinent part:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the mean-
ing of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An
action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than
money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer
or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity
or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief
therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States
or that the United States is an indispensable party. The United
States may be named as a defendant in any such action, and ajudgment or decree may be entered against the United States:
Provided, That any mandatory or injunctive decree shall specify
the Federal officer or officers (by name or by title), and their suc-
cessors in office, personally responsible for compliance. Nothing
herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the power
or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any
other appropriate legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers au-
thority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to
suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.4
Both the Administrative Procedure Act and the individual agency statute
help the regulatee evaluate whether judicial review of the agency action is
available, as well as the extent or scope of such review by the court.5 A
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or ToRTs ch. 45A, Introductory Note at 395(1972:tort action for damages is one means of obtaining a judicial determina-
tion of whether the governmental action is unauthorized or wrongful.
There are other methods of obtaining judicial review of administrative
action, such as suit for a declaratory judgment, for an injunction, for
mandamus, for habeas corpus or for establishing possession of or title to
property. Viewed in this light, the availability of the tort action against
the government or a public officer is only a fractional part of the broad
question of whether the governmental action should be subjected at all
to court review. For this reason the subject of governmental tort immunity
has often been regarded as primarily concerned with the fields of consti-
tutional law, administrative law and local government law; and some of
the most thorough studies of the subject matter are to be found in treatises
and articles by authorities in these fields.
3. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
5. Of course, the courts themselves shape a regulatee's right to review. The
following observation has been made regarding the role of the courts in establish-
ing the rules of judicial review:
The detailed law of judicial review is mostly the product of fluctuating
case-law, which the courts develop in an unplanned and essentially untidy
manner. But taken as a whole their work expresses vital constitutional
principles which form a very important part of the regulating mechanism
[Vol. 45
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statute on its face may foreclose judicial review, or specifically provide for
it,'or not address the matter at all.6 Mere silence does not necessarily indi-
cate preclusion,7 but when judicial review is prescribed, it must be attained
in accordance with the statute.8 The method, the timing, the forum, and
the form of the action as specified in the statute must be followed.
The actions taken by an administrative agency are generally described,
as quasi-executive, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. 9 It is to the last two
functions, once finalized by the agency, to which most judicial review is
directed.' 0 When an agency sets rules, regulations, or guidelines that ad-
versely affect the regulatee's rights (for example, by placing him in an un-
fair competitive position, or by putting him in jeopardy of penalty or
imprisonment), then there exist opportunities for judicial review to re-
form or annul such quasi-legislative acts. Similarly, when some right of
the regulatee has been adversely adjudicated by an agency, and if the mat-
ter has the indicia of a case or controversy, then such review will be mean-
ingful and available."'
of democratic government. This constitutional aspect is... easily seen...
since so many American cases are governed by the Bill of Rights or by
general statutes such as the Administrative Procedure Act.
B. ScmVARTz & H. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMM.NT: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
IN Brl" rN AND THE UNITED STArES 205 (1972).
'6. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976):
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial
review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling
not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final
agency action. Except as othenvise expressly required by statute, agency
action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section whether or
not there has been presented or determined an application for a declara-
tory order, for any form of reconsiderations, or, unless the agency other-
wise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inopera-
tive, for an appeal to superior agency authority.
7. See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944).
8. See Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005, 1009 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Where
an act provides procedures for judicial review, a court cannot review an agency
decision by any other means .. ").
9. As to the significance of "quasi" in describing these functions, see Mul-
hearn v. Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 2 N.J. 356, 66 A.2d 726 (1949).
10. See REPORT OF THE ATrY GENERAi's COMM'N ON ADMINIsTRATIvE PRO-
CrDuaR 7 (1941). In the area of quasi-executive power, much of such activity is
cloaked with organizational and individual discretion far less subject to timely
agency and judicial review.
11. For a recent discussion of the "amount in controversy" requirement for
constitutional claims, see Chagnon v. Bell, 468 F. Supp. 927 (D.D.C. 1979). Plain-
tiffs had brought suit against the Attorney General and three Federal Bureau of
Investigation employees seeking damages and declaratory relief for allegedly il-
legal surveillance. The district court carefully distinguished Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247 (1978), in which the United States Supreme Court held that compensa-
tory damages should not be awarded for violation of fifth amendment rights (pro-
cedural due process) absent a showing of actual harm. Recognizing that Carey did
not address violations of rights other than those protected by the fifth amendment,
the Chagnon court concluded that plaintiffs had a compensable claim which
could be heard by the court:
Plaintiffs' claims for relief from an allegedly illegal search and seizure in
623-
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As is well known to students of administrative law and procedure,
judicial relief for supposed or threatened injury does not become available,
however, until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.12
This follows from the accepted proposition that premature interruptions
of the administrative process, if permitted, will undermine both the ef-
ficiency and the autonomy of the government agency. Thus, "exhaustion
of remedies" within the agency framework is the rule unless it appears
early and obviously that the agency is operating outside the scope of its
mandate.13 This is supported by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which
dictates that conflicts between the agency's underlying statute and its regu-
latory scheme will not usually be presented in court until the agency has
had a chance to set forth its interpretation of its own regulations.' 4 A clear
showing of irreparable injury from an impending or ongoing agency action,
however, may permit judicial review into the agency process despite the
exhaustion and primary jurisdiction doctrines.15
When judicial review is precluded by statute, or when an agency re-
fuses to invoke remedial machinery that exists to vindicate an affirmative
right, filing a complaint as an independent cause of action in tort may be
a means for speedy redress, and a useful device to escape the frustration
violation of the Fourth Amendment therefore do state claims which may
be compensated by more than nominal damages. Since it cannot be said
to a legal certainty that the amount of compensable damage for such an
alleged violation to each plaintiff is less than the $10,000 amount in
controversy requirement, we hold that this Court also has jurisdiction to
consider plaintiffs' constitutional claims.
468 F. Supp. at 930-31. Having resolved the above questions in plaintiffs' favor,
the district court then dismissed the case on the grounds that the defendants en-
joyed a qualified immunity as to the damages claim, and that declaratory relief
was inappropriate based on the facts of the case. Id. at 934.
12. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). See also
McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 (1971).
13. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969); Downen v. Warner, 481
F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1973); Lone Star Cement Corp. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 505 (9th Cir.
1964); K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAw Txr § 20.03 (3d ed. 1972). Judicial review
of agency action may also be precluded when the action complained of is one
committed to agency discretion. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2) (1976), which provides
an exception to the judicial review standard in the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976 & Supp. II 1978), to the extent that "agency ac-
tion is committed to agency discretion by law." This exception is applicable where
the statute by its use of the word "may" indicates an intent to impart discretionary
authority, and where statutes are drawn very broadly. See Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); Arizona Power Auth. v. Morton,
549 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977); K. DAvis, ADAMNISTRATIW
LAw TLxr § 28.05 (3d ed. 1972). In deciding whether agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law, it is not significant that there may be law, in the abstract,
that could possibly be applied. See Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467 (9th Cir.
1975).
14. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. &c Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 900 (3d Cir.
1977). See also Shamloo v. Mississippi State Bd. of Trustees of Insts. of Higher
Learning, 620 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1980).
15. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercroft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974); Sears,
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of preclusion or agency inertia.' 6 Fairness dictates that when administrative
remedial machinery either does not exist, or fails to vindicate an affirma-
tive right, then, as one court has stated, "[T]here can be no objection to
an independent cause of action in the federal courts."' 7 In this context,
various procedures for review, including mandamus, may be exerted.' 8
Even when denial of a cause of action is appropriate, the frustrated and
angry regulatee may find it enjoys renovation through constructive ju-
dicial effort.
II. TORT ACTIONS AS A REMEDY FOR THM INJLUED REGULATEE
Given that a tort action may be available to review agency action, the
breadth of such a species of tort becomes an important consideration. Al-
though suit in tort is viewed as an alternative method of judicial review
of administrative law and procedure, the theory of the basic tort action is
worth reiterating. A suit in tort is a cause of action based upon civil wrong-
doing by one party adversely affecting the person, psyche, property, pros-
pects, or peace of mind of another. Besides the traditional spectrum of
tortious causes of action known to offer redress against individuals for their
civil wrongs, two other tort classifications are available when the tortfeasor
is a governmental agency or individual(s) representing that agency. One
such group may be termed "constitutional torts."' 9 These consist of gov-
16. See Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977). Class
action plaintiffs alleged violations of a portion of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (amended 1978), which prohibits discrimination against
qualified handicapped persons in programs receiving federal financial assistance,
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and other federal stat-
utes. The Seventh Circuit, reversing the trial court which had dismissed the law-
suit, held that a private cause of action could be implied to vindicate statutorily
created rights. 548 F.2d at 1287-88. The court went on to point out that "[t]here
being no administrative remedy open to these plaintiffs, neither the exhaustion
nor primary jurisdiction doctrine applies." Id. at 1287. It is interesting to note
that plaintiffs' complaint embraced some fundamental tort causes of action, in-
cluding interference with employment prospects (right to contract) and mental
distress.
17. 548 F.2d at 1286.
18. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
908 (1978) (compelling cessation of unreasonable delays in Social Security Ad-
ministration hearings).
19. A tort action may be useful to accomplish judicial review of a govern-
mental activity whether prospective, ongoing, or past. In this latter group are
the legion of cases which arise because an agency has made a decision to terminate
a job, a benefit, a contractual arrangement, or a particular status without a pre-
termination hearing and/or a full evidentiary hearing. These are always alleged
to be fourteenth amendment violations. The decisions turn on whether privileges,
interests (liberty or property), or entitlements are at stake, and whether concepts
of procedural due process are applicable. See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz,
435 U.S. 78 (1978) (suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)). One of plaintiff's
claims was that the state medical school failed to follow its own rules regarding
academic evaluation of students, and that this violated her fourteenth amendment
due process rights. The Supreme Court did not uphold plaintiffs argument, but
the decision was arguably based more on the factual underpinnings of plaintiffs
claim rather than on her theoretical legal reasoning. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
1980]
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ernmental wrongdoings which violate the constitutional rights of the plain-
tiff. The other group, reliant on the first but worthy of separate classifica-
Stion, may be termed "statutory torts," of which 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is.a prime
example.2 0 While redress under these two classifications is often 'not .di-
rectly financially rewarding in terms of the traditional damage award, it
'is indirectly rewarding if it ends a practice that is economically or. per-
sonally damaging to the plaintiff.21 In fact, an injunction against-govern-
ment agency transgression may be more valuable than a financial award
years after the fact. Suits based on a "constitutional" or "statutory" tort
theory also have the same deterrence value of regular torts suits.
565 (1975). See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The courts
have been less likely to demand a formal due process hearing for jeopardy, of a
"liberty interest" protected by the fourteenth amendment. See Bishop v. Wood,
426 U.S. 341 (1976). Where a "property interest" is at stake, rigid conformance
with due process requirements may be necessary. See, e.g., Ortwein v. Mackey, 511
F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1975).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within thejurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immun-
ities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
21. In point of fact, most readers who have used diet foods and beverages
will recall that cyclamates were removed from the marketplace almost seven years
ago. The owner of the patent and manufacturer, Abbott Laboratories, has sought
for years to have the Food and Drug Administration readmit such products to use,
in light of new scientific evidence. Having exhausted all avenues in the -agency,
Abbott Laboratories filed suit seeking an order mandating prompt action by the
FDA, or in trial Judge Moran's words, "Abbott's efforts have been toward per-
suading the court to substitute itself as decision maker and to make a substantive
determination that cyclamate is safe to a reasonable certainty. The court is not
so persuaded. That does not mean, however, that plaintiff may not be entitled to
more limited relief." Abbott Lags. v. Harris, [1980 New Matters] FooD DRUG Cos. L.
Rrp. (CCH) 1f 38,046 (N.D. Ill., June 12, 1980).
When federal courts try cases based upon traditional torts causes, they use
the substantive law and the accouterments of the particular state involved. See
Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 327 (2d Cir. 1978). Damages also fit
the parameters of that general picture. With respect to "constitutional" torts and
some "statutory" torts, the court's discretionary powers are not likely to make
for consistency in such awards. These awards often contemplate the realities of
the financial resources of the governmental treasury and the individual tortfeasors,
along with the gravamen of the tort. See Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional
Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey v. Piphus, 93 HAav. L. REv. 966 (1980):[R]eliance on the "background of tort liability" in construing constitu-
tional torts is inappropriate with respect to damages. The purpose of both
section 1983 and Bivens-type remedies is not merely compensation for the
consequential injuries that accompany a constitutional violation, but more
fundamentally, redress for the abridgement of the constitutional right
itself.
...[Tlhe common law model is an inappropriate reference point
for measuring damages, not only for substantive constitutional violations,
but also for denials of procedural due process.
Id. at 967, 974.
[Vol: 45
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [1980], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss4/3
REMEDIES FOR GOVERNMENTAL WRONGS
These two groups of tort actions meet with particular defenses. As for
the "constitutional torts," the defenses partake of the special language of
the United States Constitution and interpretation thereof by the United
States Supreme Court.2 2 In the case of "statutory torts," a plaintiff is often
met with procedural defenses in addition to substantive defenses based on
constitutional principles. 23
A. Case Study: License Denial as Grounds for a Civil Rights Action
For nine years Mr. Shamie tried to obtain a liquor license from the
city of Pontiac, Michigan, without success. 24 His was a first application; he
had not suffered a revocation for cause. As a general rule, the issue of
granting or refusing a license application, whether it be to drive a car, to
practice medicine, or to buy and sell liquor, is not usually subject to the
adjudicative processes within an agency. The application is made, requested
qualifications are examined, and a grant or denial of license is made sum-
marily. In some statutes there are small elements for discretion by the licen-
sing board, but even as to these adjudication is not the rule. The statutes
normally provide for the quasi-judicial apparatus of the licensing agency
22. Administrative agencies regularly raise the defense that their actions are
not subject to judicial review at the time suit is brought. But even in those in-
stances where a preclusory statute and seemingly pronounced legislative intent
exist to deny judicial review of the agency action, such immunity from review
must fall before the need to vindicate constitutional guarantees. See Butz v. Eco-
nomou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (holding that federal executive officials have an
immunity no different from that of their peers in state government); Lehmann,
Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts
Committed by Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS CONSr. L.Q. 531 (1977).
23. While a demand for recovery based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) is often
coupled with recitation of a cause of action based upon trespass to the person or
disruption of his emotional well-being, § 1983 itself has been substantially dis-
tinguished from any need to show the willful intent of the defendant as would be
required for a criminal prosecution. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the
seminal § 1983 case, Justice Douglas said the action should merely be read in
analogy to the "background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the
natural consequences of his actions." Id. at 187. It was no accident, therefore,
that with this history the various common law defenses would be available to as-
sist in the defense of a § 1983 action.
Section 1983 on its face imposes a requirement that defendant act under color
of state law. When a court seeks to find "state action" where the impetus for the
constitutional deprivation is private, fact finding must reveal that the state has
become significantly involved with the alleged violative actions. The mere fact
of state regulation alone does not transform what is essentially a private action
into "state action" for purposes of a § 1983 cause of action. No easy answer exists
to the question of whether particular discriminatory conduct is private or has
such a state involvement or nexus as to permit relief under § 1983. Rather, the
facts in each case must be sifted, and the circumstances weighed, before a determi-
nation can be made as to whether the "state action" requirement is met.
Federal agents are not subject to suit under § 1983 because they act under
color of federal law, not state law. See Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855, 862 (5th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965); Askew v. Bloemker, 548 F.2d 673,
676-77 (7th Cir. 1976); Felder v. Daley, 403 F. Supp. 1324, 1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
LaRouche v. City of New York, 369 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
24. Shamie v. City of Pontiac, 620 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1980).
1980]
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to operate only in those cases where the prior grant of license is to be re-
voked, suspended, or reinstated. For the applicant, failure to receive a
license ultimately means failure to obtain a return on the investment in
preparation for the license.
Following his repeated failures to receive a liquor license, Shamie filed
suit in federal district court against the city and various city officials, al-
leging infringement of his due process rights and violations of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. According to Monell v. Department of Social Services,25 local
governments enjoy immunity from suit under section 1983 unless "the ac-
tion that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promul-
gated by that body's officers." 26 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit found that the city's persistent refusal to give Shamie
reasons for denying his application was a proper trigger to the Monell
exception as a "deprivation" that had been "claimed from a decision issu-
ing from a policy or 'custom' of the local government." 27 The court then
considered the merits of Shamie's claim. The district court had found that
under applicable Michigan law, a first-time applicant is not normally en-
titled even to minimal due process.28 One theory for this holding would be
that an impossible burden would be imposed upon state licensing boards
if they were required to accord a hearing and make a quasi-judicial deter-
mination for each license applicant who failed. The district court had also
found, however, that an agreement between Shamie and the city attorney
that Shamie would be given reasons for future denials of his application
endowed Shamie with a "property" interest, something as a novitiate in
liquor licensure he had not previously possessed.29 On this basis the trial
court held, rather strangely, that he had been denied due process, and as-
sessed exemplary damages of twenty-five dollars per day to accrue from the
date the city first failed to live up to the agreement until it did.0 The
complaint against the individual city officials was dismissed, but the city
sought reversal of the damage judgment on appeal. Finding no constitu-
tional violation, the Sixth Circuit reversed the trial court's judgment, and
25. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Independent of whether municipal corporations are
per se "persons' within the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, individual city officials
are liable in their official capacities. They are proper parties and are liable in
tort for deprivations occasioned by them under city ordinances. See Uhl v. Ness
City, 406 F. Supp. 1012, 1016 (D. Kan. 1975), affd, 590 F.2d 839 (10th Cir.
1979); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 F. Supp. 1397, 1401 (D. Colo.), aff'd
mem., 399 U.S. 901 (1970). Often a municipality, its agencies, and/or its agents are
the sole source of services vital to residents. For example, when the Board of Water
Supply is the sole source of water service, the unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious
termination of that service, by its nature a constitutionally protected entitlement,
will be seen as violative of due process. Uhl v. Ness City, 406 F. Supp. at 1018.
26. 436 U.S. at 690.
27. 620 F.2d at 120.
28. Shamie v. City of Pontiac, 443 F. Supp. 679, 682-83 (E.D. Mich. 1977),
rev'd, 620 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1980).
29. 443 F. Supp. at 684.
30. Id. at 685.
[Vol. 45
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carefully distinguished Shamie's status from that of recent plaintiffs who
have symbolized the "due process" revolution of the last decade:
[T]he City's promise to tell him why his application might be re-
jected does not automatically confer on him a "property interest"
protected by constitutional due process. The City's agreement al-
tered Shamie's legal rights only insofar as he thereby became en-
titled to the benefit of his bargain. Our research has produced no
authority to support a contrary conclusion. Shamie's expectations
here simply do not rise to the level of the "property interests"
traditionally afforded due process protection. His status is not com-
parable to that of welfare recipients' loss of benefits, Goldberg v.
Kelly; parolees threatened with revocation of parole or probation,
Morissey v. Brewer, and Gagnon v. Scarpelli; wage earners against
whom an order of attachment is sought, Sniadach v. Family Fi-
nance Corp.; or a driver who faces revocation of driver's license,
Bell v. Burson. Neither do his interests arise from "independent
sources such as state law. '"3 1
The Shamie decision provides some insight as to the qualifications
that a would-be plaintiff should possess in order to bring an action for
license denial, but dearly it will be difficult to bootstrap such a claim to
the level of a constitutional deprivation. Courts are still most likely to
intercede when plaintiff links his loss or damage to property rights in is-
sue, such as where a claim for license denial involves a prior grant of license
which has been revoked.32
B. The Immunity Problem: Can the Agency and/or its Officials be Sued?
Three common questions arise in this context. First, how much im-
munity, if any, does the agency possess? Second, how much immunity, if
any, does the agency official possess? Third, to the extent that such im-
munities exist, how can they be asserted, and how can they be diminished
or totally lost? The United States Supreme Court has stated that immunity
"is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a
policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government."3 3 Its
31. 620 F.2d at 121.
82. See generally In re Application of the United States, 610 F.2d 1148, 1157
(3d Cir. 1979); Mattern v. Mathews, 582 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1129 (1979).
33. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1959), in which the United States
Supreme Court conferred absolute immunity on the acting director of the Federal
Office of Rent Stabilization who was being sued for libel by former employees of
that office. In countering the "Pandora's box argument," the Court stated:
We are told that we should forbear from sanctioning any such rule of
absolute privilege lest it open the door to wholesale oppression and abuses
on the part of unscrupulous government officials. It is perhaps enough to
say that fears of this sort have not been realized within the wide area of
government where a judicially formulated absolute privilege of broad
scope has long existed.
Id. at 576. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan argued that "only a qualified
privilege is necessary here, and that is all I would afford the officials.' Id. at 586
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) (confer-
ring an absolute privilege on the Postmaster General).
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grant is not to protect the private interest of the governmental official,
but rather to promote the public interest in freeing officials from. fear of
damage suits arising from acts performed in the course of carrying out their
agency function. The theory is that such suits would not only tend to in-
hibit agency initiative and action, but would also expend agency time and
energy (the public's resources) in their defense.
The doctrine of official immunity may be employed as a complete bar
to an action, thus partaking of the character of an absolute privilege de-
pending on the legal theory of the action, the nature of defendant's official
position, and the nature and circumstances of the alleged misconduct. If
in the court's interpretation the doctrine of official immunity permits the
proof of facts, which if present constitutes an affirmative defense, the ap-
plication of the doctrine is better characterized as a qualified privilege.34
Such proof may be in the form of officials' affidavits alleging good faith
in all their actions, as well as a reasonable reliance upon law and regula-
tions in both substantive and procedural aspects. Additionally, official im-
munity is not generally assertable in the face of an action limited to in-
junctive, declaratory, or mandamus relief.3 5 To allow otherwise would be
to still the effort to make an agency answer for its excesses, shortcomings, or
inertia. The doctrine of official immunity, derived from the more general
principle of sovereign immunity, is always examined in a manner to assure
it is reconcilable with the interests of individual citizens who may be eco-
nomically harmed by oppressive or malicious officials. Because such a bal-
ancing approach is essentially a judicial exercise, the body 9f the law of
immunity to civil damage suits has been largely judge-made.
Judges were themselves the first to receive immunity. The United
States Supreme Court decided in 1871 that conferral of absolute immunity
for judges was essential to free and fair action in the courts.3 6 Although
34. See, e.g., Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 908 (1974). The court pointed out the following distinction between an
absolute and qualified privilege:
The scope of the official privilege rule, or the extent of its application
to a particular official, varies depending upon the nature of his duties and
functions. We have described the absolute privilege of legislators, judges,judicial officers, and some executives which may be asserted as a plea in
bar. The doctrine is applied in a somewhat different form to other offic-
ials-a qualified privilege-whereby in an action it may be asserted as a
matter of defense, but it is "qualified" in that proof to support the de-
fense is required. This proof is often lack of malice, or good faith, or
some similar showing of good and proper cause for the act complained
of. If such a defense can be established during the course of the trial, the
jury or judge must then find for the defendant. This qualified privilege
thus does not meet that element of the purpose of the rule that the offic-
ial should not be required to expend time in the defense of litigation
brought against him, but it is in accord with the other elements.
Id. at 342.
35. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314 n.6 (1975).
36. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). Decisional 'precedents
are substantially in favor of absolute immunity for the judiciary in the exercise
of that function. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (granted § 1983 immunity
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administrative agencies'are as old as the Republic, it was mainly'via the
first World War and its aftermath that their authority was established.
The exercise of their quasi-judicial function involved sums of money and
privileges rivaling those of the "real" judiciary. As a result, it was natural
to extend the immunity granted judges to the officers carrying out a ju-
dicial function for their agencies.
One question to be resolved by the courts in the development of the
law was whether the absolute immunity accorded judges should be granted
to other agency officials, particularly with respect to section 1983 actions.
As regards prosecuting attorneys, that question was answered by the United
States Supreme Court in Imbler v. Pachtman.37 In a scenario reminiscent
of the cinematic heyday of California, shortly after convicted murderer
Paul Imbler lost his last appeal and was to be punished by death in the
gas chamber, Deputy District Attorney Richard Pachtman, who had prose-
cuted the case against him, wrote to the Governor of California describing
new evidence turned up after trial by himself and an investigator for the
state correctional authority. The evidence offered corroboration for Imbler's
alibi and testimony affecting the trustworthiness of the state's prime wit-
ness. Pachtman pointed out, however, that leads to the new information
had been available to Imbler's counsel and that none of the evidence was
conclusive of Imbler's innocence. He stated that he wrote to the governor
because he believed "'a prosecuting attorney has a duty to be fair and see
that all true facts, whether helpful to the case or not, should be pre-
sented.' "38 The letter was dated August 17, 1962. Imbler's execution was
scheduled for September 12, 1962, but was subsequently stayed.
Following the letter, Imbler filed a state habeas corpus petition, and in
the brief thereto, although praising Pachtman's post-trial detective work,
he charged that the prosecution had knowingly used false testimony* and
suppressed material evidence at Imbler's trial. The petition was denied,39
and Imber remained in prison until 1968 when he filed a petition for habeas
corpus in federal court on the same grounds. Looking solely to the record,
the district court granted the writ of habeas corpus, 40 and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed.4 1
Imbler was released.
to judges). Such immunity does not include acts and statements separate from thejudicial function. See, e.g., Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974).
Absolute immunity has also been accorded to legislators "acting in a field where
legislators traditionally have power to act." Tenney v. Brandlhove, 341 U.S. 367,
379 (1951).
37. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
38. Id. at 413 (footnote omitted).
39. In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 387 P.2d 6, 35 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 908 (1964).
40. Imbler v. Craven, -298 F. Supp. 795, 812 (C.D. Cal. 1969), affd sub nom.
Imbler v. California, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970).
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In 1972 Imbler filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Pachtman, the police fingerprint expert, and various other officers of the
Los Angeles police force, demanding $2.7 million in actual and exemplary
damages from each defendant, plus fifteen thousand dollars for attorneys'
fees. The case was eventually litigated before the United States Supreme
Court on writ of certiorari.4 2 In the majority opinion of the Court, Justice
Powell pointed out that section 1983 "provides that 'every person' who acts
under color of state law to deprive another of a constitutional right shall be
answerable to that person in a suit for damages." 48 Powell went on to
note, however, that "[t]he statute thus creates a species of tort liability
that on its face admits of no immunities, and some have argued that it
should be applied as stringently as it reads. But that view has not pre-
vailed." 44 The Court reasoned that the statutory tort described in section
1983 is "to be read in harmony with general principles of tort immun-
ities and defenses rather than in derogation of them."4 5 The Supreme
Court concluded that as acting within the scope of his duty to initiate and
pursue a prosecution, and in presentation of the state's case, a prosecuting
attorney is absolutely immune from a civil suit for damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,46 as indeed he would be were the suit couched merely in terms of
malicious prosecution.
The judiciary has been unwilling to extend the absolute immunity of
judges and prosecutors to section 1983 actions to other government officials.
For executive officials, including many agency officers, the judiciary has
developed various approaches to the issue of immunity. The United States
Supreme Court decision in Scheuer v. Rhodes47 exhibits a trend away from
42. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
43. Id. at 417.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 418 (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)).
46. Id. at 431.
47. 416 U.S. 232 (1974). The Supreme Court conferred only a qualified good
faith immunity on the governor of the state of Ohio and other state officials sued
by the parents of students killed by National Guardsmen at Kent State University.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the suit for failure to state a cause of action. 471 F.2d 430 (6th
Cir. 1972). The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
remanded the case for trial. 416 U.S. at 250. In the opinion, the Supreme Court
discussed the scope and availability of a qualified immunity:
[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the
executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the
scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circum-
stances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which lia-
bility is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for
the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled
with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of
executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.
Id. at 247-48.
See generally REtSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 45A (1979). RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D (1979), sets forth the following "black-letter" rules re-
garding the immunity of public officers:
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the complete bar of absolute official immunity. In that decision, the Court
held that when a state executive officer acts under state law, in a manner
violative of the Constitution, his affront to the superior authority of that
Constitution may strip him of his official or representative character and
may subject him personally to consequences of his individual conduct.48
A presumption of qualified immunity exists at the outset of a section
1983 action against a state official, a presumption which is shaped by the
scope of discretion and responsibilities of the particular state official, any
statutory endowment of immunity, and the particular circumstances of the
action taken. As a general rule, it can be stated that as the range of discre-
tion, responsibilities, and duties possessed by the official increases, so does
the scope of his immunity as to his official acts. 49 Both a common law im-
munity and an immunity codified by state statute may be claimed by a
given state official. The qualified immunity may be stripped from him
under certain conditions, and certainly a grant of state immunity cannot
insulate the officer from liability under a federal statute such as section
1983. An action by a state official under color of state law, which inten-
tionally, recklessly, wilfully, or wantonly causes damage to an individual
by an assault upon that individual's federal rights and privileges is not
immunized from suit. Even when the official's conduct is less than blatantly
reprehensible, the public official may lose his cloak of qualified immunity.
The public interest requires decisions and action to enforce laws for the
public protection. Public officials who fail to make decisions when they
are needed, or who fail to carry out a statutory mandate or legislative pol-
icy are not faithfully and fully performing the duty of office, and may risk
liability exposure.
The grant of qualified immunity has been gradually extended to in-
clude exercise of quasi-judicial functions by agencies and their officials,
and then to a generalized immunity for the performance of discretionary
acts. The essence of the judicial role, the power to exercise discretion, has
been distinguished by the courts as worthy of immunity.5 ° From this has
come the rather universal rule that a qualified immunity will cloak the
(2) A public officer acting within the general scope of his authority is
immune from tort liability for an act or omission involving the exercise
of a judicial or legislative function.(3) A public officer acting within the general scope of his authority is
not subject to tort liability for an administrative act or omission if(a) he is immune because engaged in the exercise of a discretionary
function,
(b) he is privileged and does not exceed or abuse the privilege, or(c) his conduct was not tortious because he was not negligent in the
performance of his responsibility.
48. 416 U.S. at 250.
49. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1959) (but holding that the prin-
ciple of immunity which frees senior public officials to exercise their duties unin-
hibited by fear of damage suits covers all public officials acting within the scope
of their assignment).
50. See cases cited note 36 supra.
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officer's, action if the allegedly tortious conduct 6ccurred during the per-
fQrmance of a discretionary function, rather than one merely ministerial. 51
The result of this has been to encourage legislation to insulate government-
al officers and employees from the consequences of allegedly tortious con-
duct while performing ministerial duties within thescope of their authority
and responsibility. While ministerial activity by minions of administrative
agencies is subject to common law scrutiny, exemption has accrued through
special legislative enactments. 52 In one instance,-immunity of the officer
is exchanged for the right to pursue the claim against the government.5 3
While judicially or legislatively conferred immunity might immunize
an agency officer from a suit in tort, except on grounds that the govern-
ment itself will allow, tortious conduct which takes on the proportions of
contra-constitutional action can and will suffer challenge in the face of
such immunity.54 The result has been to couple clear intentional tort ac-
tions for assault, battery, invasion of privacy, conversion, and the like with
allegations of the same official tortious conduct depicted as violative of
plaintiff's constitutional rights or as violative of a statute more narrowly
prohibitive of constitutional wrongdoing. Leading cases which find agency
personnel liable contain in large part descriptions of circumstances where
there has been unnecessarily cruel, violent, or officious handling of the
regulatee; where the action was carried out with demonstrable malice,
excessive force, or reckless disregard for the truth; and where there is either
express or constructive evidence that the agency officer knew he was acting
contrary to law or enforcing a law known to be invalid. For the most part,
such litigation, if successful, has struck fairly low on the agency level.
Only in recent years have state courts indicated revulsion to the con-
cept of governmental immunity. Even now, however, while lip service is
given to the theory of holding state governments and state officials liable
on the same basis as private tortfeasors, for reasons of state finance as well
as tradition most states are still dragging their feet. When the changes
occur they are limited and rarely retroactive. 55 Finally, one must note that
such changes find the judiciary in the vanguard rather than the legislature.
While perhaps the foremost case was Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dis-
trict,56 decided some twenty years ago, a number of other cases are dis-
tinguishable as bringing the anachronistic nature of governmental tort im-
munity to the attention of judicial colleagues in other states.57
51. See, e.g., Mathis v. Nelson, 79 Ga. App. 639, 54 S.E.2d 710 (1949). See
also P. KEzrON & R. K.ETON, CASES AND MATERIAIS ON THE LAw or Toms 477
(1971i. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1976).
53. Id.
54. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
55. See Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d
795 (1962); Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975); Ayala v. Philadel-
phia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973).
56. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 559 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
57. See cases cited note 55 supra.
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In summary, it can be stated that most government officials now en-
joy a qualified immunity.'An affirmative defense to a damage action against
government officials can be based upon the good faith and reasonable be-
lief in" the lawfulness of the action taken. The circumstances of taking
such action, including, for example, the amount of force used and the
excessive debasement of the individual(s) against whom the action was
taken are all highly material in determining whether immunity is approp-
riate. Clearly, a major impediment to bringing a tort cause of action against
an agency or its officers is the immunity which has been accorded to these
public-sector defendants.58
C. The Federal Tort Claims Act
The seminal statute of the federal government's consent to suit was
first enacted in 1946 as the Federal Tort Claims Act.59 The exceptions con-
tained therein, however, have proven to be snares for the unwary. For in-
stance, a physician operates on the right leg of his patient, when his entire
discussion with the patient previous to the operation and the consent ob-
tained from the patient was directed to the left leg. The patient later
brings suit60 and alleges that the Veterans Administration physician is
liable for medical malpractice and professional negligence. The govern-
ment defends by stating the action is really one in assault and battery, and
the government's motion to dismiss is granted.61
Given the breadth of the first listed exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act,62 it seems that federal officers, so long as they are exercising
58. Another substantial impediment to the recovery of damage awards is the
doctrine of sovereign immunity and the eleventh amendment prohibition against
retroactive damage awards against a state as enunciated in Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974). A thorough discussion of the eleventh amendment and its
implications for the regulatee seeking a damage award is beyond the scope of this
paper, but helpful analysis' of this topic can be found in C. ABERNATHY, CVmL
lirIGTs CASES AND MATERIALS 202-18 (1980). See also RESTATEMIENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 895B (1979), which sets forth the following "black-letter" rules regarding
the liability exposure of the states:
(1) A State and its governmental agencies are not subject to suit without
the consent of the State.
(2) Except to the extent that a State declines to give consent to tort lia-
bility, it and its governmental, agencies are subject to the liability.(3) Even when a State is subject to tort liability, it and its governmental
agencies are immune to the liability for acts and omissions constituting
(a) the exercise of a judicial or legislative function, or
(b) the exercise of an administrative function involving the determi-
nation of fundamental governmental policy.
(4) Consent to suit and repudiation of general tort immunity do not es-
tablish liability for an act or omission that is otherwise privileged or is
not tortious.
59. ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680
(1976)).
60. Moos v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 275 (D. Minn. 1954).
61. Id. at 277.
62. The exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act are set forth at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680 (1976), which reads as follows:
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due care in effectuation of the statutes and regulations that are their charge,
are outside of the "consent to sue" given by the Act, even if the statutes
or regulations they are implementing prove invalid. Similarly, even if the
federal actors have patently abused their discretion, their performance of
a discretionary function within the scope of their assignment moves them
beyond the pale of the Act.63 The theory which espoused the enactment
of the Federal Tort Claims Act was that governmental efforts should
achieve a reasonable level of efficiency and responsibility, and that failure
to meet this standard should result in liability exposure similar to that
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regula-
tion, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
tionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent trans-
mission of letters or postal matter.(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any
tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any
officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer.(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752,
781-790 of Title 46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the
United States.(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of
the -Government in administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of Title
50, Appendix.(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment
of a quarantine by the United States.
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, mis-
representation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided,
That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement
officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter
and section 1346 (b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or
after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution.
For the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement of-
ficer" means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to
execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of
Federal law.(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the
Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system.(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military
or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
S Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority.
(in) Any claim arising from the activites of the Panama Canal Com-
pany.(n) Any claim arising from the activites of a Federal land bank, a
Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives.
63. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). The Act has also been
held not to authorize suit against the federal government on claims based on
strict or absolute liability for ultrahazardous activity. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S.
797 (1972). For a critique of this latter decision, see Peck, Laird v. Nelms: A Callfor Review and Revision of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 48 WAsH. L. Rxv. 391(1973).
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which exists in the private sector. The exceptions to the Act, however,
continue to immunize the United States against the usual run of intentional
torts, expressly excluding claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, defama-
tion, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.64
It is important to recognize that the United States Supreme Court
decision in Dalehite v. United States65 has served to immunize federal
actors from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act if those actors
are performing a discretionary function. In that 1947 decision, the gov-
ernment was held not liable for extensive damage resulting from the ex-
plosion of two cargo vessels in the harbor of Texas City, Texas. The Court,
in interpreting the "discretionary" provision in the Federal Tort Claims
Act, stated the following:
It is unnecessary to define, apart from this case, precisely where
discretion ends. It is enough to hold, as we do, that the "discretion-
ary function or duty" that cannot form a basis for suit under the
Tort Claims Act includes more than the initiation of programs
and activities. It also includes determinations made by executives
or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules
of operations. Where there is room for policy judgment and deci-
sion there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of subordi-
nates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance
with official directions cannot be actionable.66
There is some evidence that this position has eroded, at least with
respect to benefactory services of government agencies. In Ozark Air Lines,
Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,67 for example, a federal district court found
that the United States, through its Federal Aviation Administration ground
controller, was negligent with respect to a ground collision of two taxiing
aircraft. The court pointed out that "when the government undertakes to
perform services not required by specific legislation, it has the duty to per-
form these services carefully." 6s Perhaps of greater significance, however, is
the provision in the 1974 amendments to the Act which removed the shield
against claims sounding in assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, and abuse of process if alleged to have been com-
mitted by federal investigative or law enforcement officers.69
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976). The first six exceptions cited in the text are
actionable if committed by federal investigative or law enforcement officers. See
note 69 and accompanying text infra.
65. 846 U.S. 15 (1953).
66. Id. at 85-36.
67. 402 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. 1M. 1975).
68. Id. at 693. See also Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955);
Somlo v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976). See, e.g., Cruikshank v. United States, 467 F.
Supp. 539 (D. Hawaii 1979) (plaintiff recovered for invasion of privacy and il-
legal, warrantless search when CIA intercepted and opened his mail).
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III. CONCLUSION
For a number of years now, perhaps instigated by the pace-quickening
effect of Goldberg v. Kelly,70 it has become increasingly apparent that the
judiciary will not sit idly by and allow an administrative agency, be it
federal, state, or local, to by-pass rights guaranteed the regulatees and the
general public by the first fourteen amendments. An independent action in
tort is available to the regulatee who has suffered injury as a result of
agency action, but such an action is likely to meet with formidable bar-
riers, such as exhaustion requirements, preclusion statutes, statutorily and
judicially created immunities, and common law and statutory defenses. In
addition, the expansion of the doctrine of equitable abstention, 71 which
requires federal courts to abstain from adjudication of federal constitutional
claims in deference to pending state court proceedings, could curb federal
court intervention into state agency processes. The case of Withrow v.
Larkin72 is a perfect example of a federal court ruling too harshly and too
quickly on a matter better resolved by state agencies or courts. Nonetheless,
given the proper set of circumstances, the tort action may offer an attractive
alternative to the litigious regulatee. Only through the development of
fair, efficient state and federal agencies will the need for the torts claim
as a remedy for governmental wrongdoing be diminished.
70. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
71. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). This is not to say
that the federal courts will refuse to exercise their judicial powers courageously and
decisively.
72. 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (reversing injunction granted by three-judge panel
which enjoined Wisconsin State Examining Board from conducting contested hear-
ing to determine whether physician had engaged in professional misconduct).
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